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Abstract 
Online social media have become the main communication medium for political 
discussion. The online ecosystem, however, does not only include human users but 
has given a space to an increasing number of automated accounts, referred to as 
bots, extensively used to spread messages and manipulate the narratives others are 
exposed to. Although social media service providers put increasing efforts to protect 
their platforms, malicious bot accounts continuously evolve to escape detection. In 
this work, we monitored the activity of almost 245K accounts engaged in the Twitter 
political discussion during the last two US voting events. We identified approximately 
31K bots and characterized their activity in contrast with humans. We show that, in 
the 2018 midterms, bots changed the volume and the temporal dynamics of their 
online activity to better mimic humans and avoid detection. Our findings highlight the 
mutable nature of bots and illustrate the challenges to forecast their evolution. 
 
 
Introduction 
The complexity of today’s online ecosystem captures the facets of modern 
information society: Accessing the news, sharing opinions, and entertaining social 
connections are just a few examples of the variety of engagements that individuals 
regularly perform online. Political communication is no exception, as it has moved 
from the world to the digital one. However, various risks (still largely unquantified) 
may associate with this change of norms, which in turn may seriously impact the real 
world. Malicious actors, e.g., foreign agents or scammers (Ferrara, 2019), may 
embed themselves in online social systems and interact with social network users 
with the objective of deceiving them and manipulating the public opinion. 
 
In the political context, the 2016 Brexit referendum and the 2016 US Presidential 
election represent recent remarkable examples of social media political manipulation 
(​Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; ​Howard ​et al.​, 2016; Del Vicario ​et al.​, 2017; ​Howard & 
Kollanyi, 2017; Allcott & ​Gentzkow,​ 2017; Woolley & ​Guilbeault​, 2017; Badawy ​et al.​, 
2018a; Addawood ​et al., ​2019; Badawy ​et al.​, 2019). ​Since then, service providers 
have been increasing their efforts to suspend malicious actors and maintain a 
healthy conversation on their platforms. However, nefarious activity on social media 
has not entirely stopped: social media bots (in short, ​bots​), automated and 
software-controlled accounts (Ferrara ​et al​., 2016a), and trolls, human operators 
often associated with foreign entities, are still active online (​Badawy ​et al.​, 2018a; 
Badawy ​et al.​, 2019; ​Luceri ​et al.​, 2019; Im ​et al.​, 2019). These play a pivotal role in 
information and disinformation campaigns globally (Ratkiewicz ​et al.​, 2011;  Metaxas 
and Mustafaraj, 2012; Ferrara, 2017; Howard ​et al.​, 2017; Shu ​et al.​, 2017; Badawy 
1 
et al.​, 2018b; Vosoughi ​et al. ​, 2018; Stella ​et al.​, 2018; Bovet and Makse, 2019; 
Gringberg ​et al.​, 2019; Scheufele & Krause, 2019; Stella ​et al.​, 2019, ​Ruck et al.​, 
2019). Detection of coordinated campaigns is an open challenge for the research 
community (Ferrara ​et al​., 2016b; Varol ​et al​., 2017a; Chen & Subramanian, 2018). 
 
In particular, bots, due to their scalable nature, represent a major concern in the fight 
against media manipulation (Varol ​et al.​, 2017b; Monsted ​et al.​, 2017; Boichak ​et al.​, 
2018; Shao ​et al. ​, 2018; Yang ​et al.​, 2019), as further demonstrated by the recent 
suspension of millions of compromised accounts by Facebook [​1​] and Twitter [​2​]. On 
July 1st, 2019, California became the first State to attempt regulating the usage of 
bots​ ​by requiring a self-disclosure of automated accounts that​ intended to 
impersonate or replicate human activity on social media ​(cf., ​SB-1001 Bots: 
disclosure​ [​3 ​]). In such a scenario, understanding how human users deal with these 
automated accounts and manipulation attempts is of paramount importance. On the 
other hand, detecting and keeping the pace of increasingly sophisticated malicious 
accounts is needed to build and adapt effective countermeasures.  
 
Here, we show how bots’ and humans’ online activity has mutated over the last two 
US voting events, i.e., the 2016 Presidential election and the 2018 midterms. To this 
end, we captured the associated online political discussion on Twitter and monitored 
a set of about 245K accounts that were substantially active in both the events. 
Approximately 31K accounts were labeled as likely bots by ​Botometer​ (Davis ​et al.​, 
2016; Varol ​et al.​, 2017b), a machine learning tool for bot detection on Twitter. We 
consider the overlapping set of users present in both the circumstances to perform a 
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comparative analysis between the two election periods. The rationale is to analyze 
the evolution of human and bot activity, behavior, and interplay. 
 
We compared the temporal activity of bots and human users, recognizing differences 
in their trends during the 2016 election and similar patterns during the 2018 
midterms, which might suggest that bots have been refined to better emulate 
humans and to avoid detection. We analyzed the volume of each sharing activity 
(i.e., tweet, retweet, reply, and mention) in the two election periods. We noticed a 
significant drop in the volume of retweets generated from both human and bot 
accounts in the 2018 election. On the one hand, humans doubled the usage of 
replies in the midterms with respect to the 2016 Presidential election. On the other 
hand, bots’ propensity to repeatedly share the same content diminished during the 
2018 midterms, fostering a coordinated (multi-bot) strategy, possibly to create an 
illusion of a consensus. While during the 2016 election bots tried to sow division 
around various issues (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016), here we show that in the 2018 
midterms, bots aimed at surveying human preferences and intents.  
 
Our work conveys two findings: On the one hand, the growing usage of replies, 
along with the decreasing (low-cost) content re-sharing, indicates an increasing 
propensity of human users to discuss their ideas instead of only re-sharing others’ 
content. This represents an encouraging step forward in the quest against 
misinformation spread. On the other hand, the evolving nature of bots and their 
mutable intents pose novel computational challenges in regard to their modeling and 
detection. 
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 Methodology 
Data collection​: We captured the political discussion on Twitter by gathering election 
related posts (tweets) during the two election periods. We employed the Python 
module Twython to collect tweets through the Twitter API using a set of keywords as 
a filter. Keywords were selected ad hoc per each election, as described next. For the 
2016 US Presidential Election, 23 keywords (see Supplement for the list of 
keywords) were used to collect tweets from September 16, 2016 to October 21, 
2016, as detailed in (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016).​ ​Overall, 42.1 million tweets generated 
from 5.9 million users were gathered. For the 2018 US Midterms, tweets were 
collected from October 6, 2018 to November 19, 2018 using the following keywords: 
2018midtermelections ​, ​2018midterms​, ​elections ​, ​midterm​, and ​midtermelections​. As 
a result, we obtained 2.6 million tweets from 997,406 users. 
 
Data processing​: In this study, we take into account only the users present in both 
datasets. Thereby, we consider the 278,181 accounts that tweeted both in 2016 and 
2018. This subset of users represent a continuum between the two election 
conversations, other than the core of the online discussion. In fact, these users were 
involved (as authors of tweets, or as retweeted/replied/mentioned users) in 54 
percent and 65 percent of the tweets collected in 2016 and 2018, respectively. 
To examine the same time window for the two voting events, data from the two 
datasets have been filtered considering only tweets ranging from the month prior to 
the day following the election. The 2016 US Presidential election occurred on 
November 8, 2016. The 2018 midterms occurred on November 6, 2018. The filtering 
4 
results in 8,383,611 tweets from 2016, and 660,296 from 2018, originating in total 
from 245K users. 
 
Bot Detection​: One of the most important tasks for the uncovering and understanding 
of social media manipulation is the identification of automated accounts, i.e., bots. 
Researchers brought to the table a variety of solutions for the detection of bots 
(Chavoshi ​et al. ​, 2016; Subrahmanian ​et al.​, 2016; Chen & Subramanian, 2018). 
While increasingly sophisticated techniques keep emerging (Kudugunta & Ferrara, 
2018), in this study, we rely upon ​Botometer​ [​4​], a publicly-available machine 
learning-based tool maintained by Indiana University (Davis ​et al.​, 2016; Varol ​et al.​, 
2017b; Yang ​et al​., 2019) to detect automated accounts on Twitter. It is based on an 
ensemble classifier that aims to provide an indicator, namely ​bot score​, used to 
classify an account either as a bot or as a human. To feed the classifier, the 
Botometer API extracts about 1,200 features related to the Twitter account under 
analysis. These features fall in six broad categories and characterize the account's 
profile, friends, social network, temporal activity patterns, language, and sentiment. 
 
Botometer outputs a bot score: the lower the score, the higher the probability that the 
user is human. Prior studies used the 0.5 threshold to separate humans from bots. 
However, according to the re-calibration introduced in Botometer ​v3​ (Yang ​et al ​., 
2019), along with the emergence of increasingly more sophisticated bots, we here 
used a bot score threshold to 0.3 (i.e., a user is labeled as a bot if the score is above 
0.3). This threshold corresponds to the same level of algorithmic sensitivity of a 
score equal to 0.5 in prior versions of Botometer (cf. Fig. 5 from (Yang ​et al ​., 2019)).  
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 We scored the 244,699 accounts on January 2019. The bot score distribution is 
displayed in ​Figure 1​. Most of the accounts (about 80 percent) are below the knee of 
the curve, which is approximately around the bot score value of 0.2. This suggests 
that the value of 0.3, chosen as bot score threshold, represents a conservative 
choice as no significant difference would occur in the classification by further 
increasing the threshold. As a result, over the scored accounts, 12.6 percent were 
classified as bots, 86.1 percent as humans, while the remaining 1.3 percent of the 
accounts were not found on Twitter (indicating users that have deleted their account, 
have been suspended for violation of the Twitter rules, or have been quarantined by 
Twitter for further verification). The percentage of discovered bots (12.6 percent) 
represent a consistent result with respect to previous studies, e.g., the analysis of 
the 2016 US Presidential election (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016). 
 
Figure 1:​ Bot score distribution of the 244,699 accounts scored with Botometer [​4​] 
 
Sentiment Analysis​: To characterize the emotional content generated by both 
humans and bots, we rely upon sentiment analysis. More specifically, we employ 
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SentiStrength (Thelwall & Paltoglou, 2010) to map each tweet to the sentiment it 
expresses. SentiStrength is a lexicon-based approach that is conceived for social 
media text analysis. Lexicon-based algorithms are based on sentiment lexicons, 
dictionary of emotions where words are attributed a given sentiment strength. 
SentiStrength attributes a numerical score of sentiment intensity. In particular, it 
returns separately both a positive and negative score, which range from 1 to 5 (with 
5 being the greatest strength). Overall, we are interested in the total sentiment, thus, 
we subtract the negative sentiment from the positive one. Thereby, the final score 
ranges from -4 (most negative) to 4 (most positive).  
 
Granger Causality​: To investigate the interplay between humans and bots, we 
evaluate whether human interaction with bots can be predicted by leveraging the 
volume of bots activity. To this end, we use the Granger causality test (Granger, 
1969) on the time series representing the volume of shared content of these two 
classes of users.  
 
More in general, Granger causality is used to determine whether time series X can 
be used to predict time series Y. Granger causality postulates that X 
“Granger-causes” Y if the predictions of future values of Y based on the combination 
of the past values of X with the past values of Y are better than the predictions of Y 
based only on the past values of Y. This holds true unless also the reverse (Y 
Granger-causes X) is verified. In such a case, no conclusion can be drawn. We 
further apply a differentiation to remove seasonal effects and, then, we tested the 
stationary time series. The autoregression of Y is augmented by lagged values of X 
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and those individually significant (t-statistic) that increase the explanatory power of 
the regression (F-test). 
 
 
Results 
In this section we present our analysis of temporal dynamics of human and bot 
activity, human and bot behavior, and causal modeling of human-bot interplay 
dynamics. 
 
Temporal dynamics​: We explore bot and human dynamics by measuring the time lag 
between consecutive sharing activities (tweets). ​Figure 2​ displays the inter-time 
tweet distribution comparing bot and human users in the 2016 and 2018 elections. 
Notably, in the 2016 election, the distribution of bots’ tweet activity largely differs 
from the humans’ distribution [ ​5​]. The discrepancy is particularly relevant in the time 
range between 10 minutes and 3 hours, consistent with other findings (Pozzana & 
Ferrara, 2018): in 2016, bots shared content at a higher rate with respect to human 
users. 
On the other hand, in the 2018 midterms, inter-time distributions are similar, 
suggesting the possibility that bots have been refined to emulate human timing. 
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 Figure 2:​ Posting inter-time for bots and humans in 2016 (left) and 2018 (right). 
 
To better understand the impact of each type of sharing activity on this result, we 
disentangle Twitter posts in tweets (original content generated by users), retweets 
(re-share of the original content generated by other users), replies (response to a 
post), and mentions (involvement of other users in a post). ​Figure 3​ depicts the 
inter-time distribution of the above sharing activities in the 2016 election. Notice that 
we do not show the corresponding plots for the 2018 midterms as no relevant 
discrepancy can be appreciated between each of these sharing activities and the 
overall distribution in ​Figure 2​ (right). From ​Figure 3​, it is noticeable that the 
inter-time distributions of tweet and retweet present the two principal gaps between 
humans and bots in 2016. This finding is in line with the established bots’ strategy 
consisting in overwhelming online platforms with high volume of tweets and retweets, 
as shown in previous studies (Ferrara ​et al.​, 2016a; Bessi & Ferrara, 2016). 
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Figure 3:​ Consecutive tweet (top left), retweet (top right), reply (bottom left), and 
mention (bottom right) inter-time for bots and humans in 2016. 
 
Activity Volume: ​ To further investigate the nature of the difference in the temporal 
dynamics, we measure the volume of each sharing activity in the two election 
periods. In ​Table 1​, we show the percentage of each activity over all the posts for 
bots and humans. It can be noticed that both humans and bots significantly 
diminished the amount of retweets in the 2018 Midterm (t-test results: 
t​(5,840,537)=64.6, ​p ​<.001 for humans and ​t​(3,083,630)=42.4, ​p​<.001 for bots), while 
the percent of mentions does not exhibit a noticeable variation in both groups of 
account. Additionally, humans have doubled the amount of replies (t-test: 
t​(5,840,537)=152.3, ​p​<.001) in 2018 and bots generated more original tweets (t-test: 
t​(3,083,630)=29.8, ​p ​<.001) in 2018 than in 2016.  
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 The growing propensity of humans to discuss a post (either positively or negatively) 
instead of simply re-sharing the content generated by other accounts, represents an 
encouraging finding. This insight acquires even more significance considering the 
cost related to each form of interaction. While retweeting is a one-click operation, 
with a relatively small human cost in terms of time and effort, a reply requires a 
larger undertaking. From the perspective of bots, a retweet can be programmatically 
executed with one command line; however, programmatically composing a 
meaningful reply requires the use of sophisticated natural language models, such as 
those based on deep neural networks (Radford​ et al., ​2019), which often require 
significant computing resources for training. 
 
Interestingly, although bots increased the amount of tweets (with respect to the 2016 
election) and, comparably to humans, reduced the amount of retweets, the gap in 
the inter-time distribution in 2018 appears to be reduced, suggesting a more cautious 
broadcasting strategy adopted by bots.   
Humans 
Sharing activity 2016 2018 
Tweet 0.16 0.15 
Retweet 0.76 0.72 
Reply 0.04 0.09 
Mention 0.04 0.04 
Bots 
Sharing activity 2016 2018 
Tweet 0.12 0.15 
Retweet 0.83 0.79 
Reply 0.02 0.03 
Mention 0.03 0.03 
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Table 1​. Volume (in percent) of sharing activities of humans (left) and bots (right) in 
the two election periods 
 
To shed light on this result and, more in general, to explore the evolution of the 
actions of both humans and bots on Twitter, we now analyze separately the three 
sharing activities that showed more variation between the two election periods, i.e., 
tweet, retweet, and reply. 
 
Tweet Activity​: As far as original tweets are concerned, we found an anomalous 
pattern in the sharing activity of bots. Both in 2016 and 2018, bots tweeted multiple 
times the content they generated. While in 2016 this repeated activity was mainly 
performed by each bot separately, i.e., each message was published multiple times 
by the same bot, in 2018 this repeated activity was also shared between bots, i.e., 
multiple bots shared the same message once. More specifically, during the 2016 
(resp. 2018) election period, 5 percent (resp. 2.4 percent) of the tweets generated by 
bots were published more than once by the same author. The significant drop (t-test: 
t​(388,196)=17.4, ​p​<.001) in this repeated activity during the 2018 election is, 
however, replaced by an increasing amount of single sharing operations (of the 
same content) performed by multiple bots, possibly in the context of a coordinated 
effort. 
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 Figure 4 ​: Probability distribution of multiple authors sharing the same content during 
the 2016 and 2018 election periods. 
 
In ​Figure 4​, we investigate this scenario by showing the probability distribution 
related to the number of multiple authors sharing the same content in 2016 and 
2018. Although the majority of content is shared by a few bots (from 2 to 3) in both 
periods under consideration, it is noticeable how in the 2018 election the number of 
authors sharing the same content increased. To evaluate the statistical difference 
between the sets of multiple authors in 2016 and 2018, we employ the 
Mann-Whitney rank test, which in turn corroborates our intuition (​p-value < 0.001​). 
We hypothesize that the distributed activity of bots can be a strategy to elicit the 
illusion of a consensus and, possibly, to avoid detection. 
 
Reply Activity​:​ ​We investigate whether the same repeated activity is also 
recognizable in the replies provided by bots to other accounts’ posts. We found 
some instances of multiple replies in both the periods under investigation, but in both 
cases with a limited extent (around 1.1 percent of replies were repeated).  
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To characterize the emotional content of the replies generated by bots and humans, 
we rely upon sentiment analysis and in particular on SentiStrength. In ​Figure 5​, we 
show the sentiment distribution of bots’ (top) and humans’ (bottom) replies (left 
plots), in contrast with the sentiment of their original tweet (right plots). 
 
Replies Original Tweets 
Bots 
  
Humans 
  
Figure 5 ​: Sentiment of bots’ (top row) and humans’ (bottom row) replies (left column) 
and original tweets (right column) 
 
 
Two facts are worth noting. First, both humans and bots shared less neutral 
(SentiStrength score = 0) replies in 2018. The sentiment gap between the two 
election periods is more evident for bots, especially for negative replies, with the 
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2016 period exhibiting significantly more negative replies than 2018. With respect to 
original tweets, no remarkable difference exists between 2016 and 2018 regardless 
of the source (human or bot). Overall, the difference between the sentiment of 
replies and original tweets is only noticeable in the 2018 election period, while the 
distributions are similar for the 2016 election.  
 
Retweet Activity​: To examine the re-sharing activity in the two voting periods, we 
initially consider the top retweeted posts created by bots and shared by humans. By 
analyzing the top 10 retweets in this subset, we notice an interesting difference 
between the two periods. In the 2016 period prior to the election, the majority of the 
retweeted posts were in support of candidate Trump, and in opposition to candidate 
Clinton. On the other hand, in the midterms, the most retweeted posts of 
bot-generated content are polls on the Twitter platform. From now on, we refer to 
these tweets to as ​poll-tweets ​. In ​Table 2​, we show the poll-tweets in the top 10 of 
human retweets of bot-generated content. The objective of these tweets seems to 
have a quantitative understanding of voter turnout, political leaning, and preferences. 
This exploratory attitude of bots in the midterms election appears in contrast with the 
behavior towards the candidates shown in the 2016 Presidential election.  
 
Although poll-tweets seem harmless and aimed only at surveying human opinion, 
their turnout might impact the human perception on the polled issues. To understand 
whether bots fostered the spread of poll-tweets, we analyzed the most retweeted 
content by bots. Results show that the most re-shared post is a poll-tweet (cf., ​Table 
2​), and 4 additional poll-tweets are in the top 10 retweeted content by bots. In ​Figure 
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6​, we depict the timeline of the hourly volume of retweets shared by bots and 
humans related to the poll-tweets listed in ​Table 2​. Notice that we do not display the 
volume of retweets in the days after October 21 as the amount of these tweets 
during that period is negligible. Interestingly, human users participated in these polls 
to a larger extent with respect to bots, which in turn were responsible for the creation 
and sharing of these posts. 
 
 
Figure 6 ​: Timeline of the retweet volume of the poll-tweets shared by bots and 
humans 
 
Additionally, to investigate whether bots’ retweet activity predicts humans 
participation in these polls, we evaluate whether the hourly volume of poll-tweets 
shared by bots “Granger-causes” the hourly volume of poll-tweets shared by 
humans. Results of the Granger-causality test, displayed in ​Table 2​ along with the 
poll-tweet content, corroborate this hypothesis. In fact, for each poll-tweet under 
investigation, the volume of retweets from bot is Granger-cause of the volume of 
human retweet.  
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 Poll-tweets  F-test p-value steps 
@kwilli1046: ​Which Party Do You Plan To Vote For In The 2018 
Midterm Election? Please vote and retweet for bigger sample size 
22.8 <0.001 1 
@The_Trump_Train: ​RT if you agree: We need ICE agents at every 
polling station during elections. 
15.2 <0.001 1 
@???: ​With all what's going on, if elections is today, would you vote 
for @realDonaldTrump? Please vote and Retweet. 
15.1 <0.001 3 
@kwilli1046: ​Should voters in federal elections be required to show 
ID at the polls? Please vote and retweet for bigger sample size 
2.9 0.01 6 
@???: ​IF, AND ONLY IF, YOU ARE VOTING ON NOV 6, 2018, 
please answer this poll. 
14.3 <0.001 2 
@Golfman072: ​As of Sept. 30th-Oct 5th how likely are you to vote in 
the MID-TERM elections? #Redwavepolls 
20.7 <0.001 1 
@Golfman072: ​As of Oct 7th-13th how likely are you to vote in the 
MID-TERM elections? #Redwavepolls 
4.5 0.03 1 
 
Table 2​. The 7 poll-tweets within the top 10 human retweets of bot-generated 
content. The first column displays the content of the poll-tweet; the second and third 
column show ​the value of F-test for significant causality and the corresponding 
p-value, respectively; the  fourth column depicts the temporal lag (in hours) for which 
the causality has the highest F-test value. Note: we show the user names of 
suspended accounts; however, for privacy reasons, we anonymized (using @???) 
the user names of active accounts associated with the originators of these examples. 
 
Interestingly, three accounts that created the most successful polls (@kwilli1046, 
@The_Trump_Train, and @Golfman072) have been suspended by Twitter. 
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Additionally, another suspended account classified as human (@MikeTokes) 
published a poll-tweet (“​NATIONAL POLL: you are voting in the November 6, 2018 
elections, what party are you voting for and why?​”) that received a large amount of 
retweets from bots (top 3 of bots-retweet from human generated content). This may 
indicate a combined approach leveraging both human and bot activities. 
 
To further explore the retweet interactions from bots to humans (i.e., bots retweeting 
human content), we measure to what extent bots targeted humans within the social 
network. Prior work shows that bots target the most connected humans (Stella ​et al.​, 
2018).​ ​In particular, the number of incoming edges (e.g., followers) is often 
associated with the influence and the centrality that each user has in the social 
network. To this end, here, we compute the in-degree centrality [​6​] of the retweet 
network. The rationale is to understand whether bots interacted mainly with the most 
retweeted (influential) humans, whose endorsement can be beneficial to spread 
information across the social network. This, in turn, might indicate a strategy for 
increasing the resonance of bots’ content.​ ​The nodes of the retweet network are the 
users, which are connected by a direct link representing a retweet. In this context, 
the in-degree centrality measures the incoming interactions of each user over all the 
interactions. Hence, accounts with high in-degree centrality indicate users whose 
content has been largely re-shared​ ​and, thus, represent highly influential nodes in 
the social network. 
 
In ​Figure 7​, we display the distribution of the in-degree centrality related to the 
humans targeted by bots in the two voting periods. Whilst in the 2018 midterms most 
18 
of the probability mass is in the range between 0 and 0.01 (low centrality score), in 
the 2016 election bots also targeted a considerable set of humans with larger 
centrality scores. On average, we find that the humans targeted by bots in 2016 has 
in-degree centrality scores two times larger with respect to the humans targeted in 
2018 (1.7·10​-2 ​ vs. 8·10 ​-3​, ​p-value ​ < .001). We conclude that in 2016 bots supporting 
the presidential candidates were interested in attracting the attention of the most 
influential human users in the social network, while during the midterms they 
interacted with any targets regardless of their position and relevance in the social 
network. 
  
Figure 7 ​: Distribution of in-degree centrality of humans targeted by bots 
 
 
To further investigate the human-bot interplay, we evaluate the causality between 
bot and human interactions. We measure the Granger causality (Granger, 1969) of 
the daily volume of retweets between humans and bots. Our results show that, in the 
2018 midterms, retweets from bots to humans (i.e., bots retweeting human 
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generated content) were Granger-cause (​F-test​ = 3.51, ​p-value = 0.02​, steps  = 5 
days) of the retweets from humans to bots, while there was no signal of Granger 
causality revealed in the 2016 election. 
 
In the 2016 Presidential election, users likely re-shared content disregarding the 
authenticity of the information and its source (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; Allcott & 
Gentzkow, 2017; Shao ​et al., ​2018; Vosoughi ​et al., ​2018; Bovet & Makse, 2019; 
Grinberg ​et al.,​ 2019; Scheufele & Krause, 2019). On the other hand, in 2018 
humans likely engaged with bots in part due to bots prior interaction with them. 
Furthermore, in 2018, the volume of retweets from bots to humans was also 
Granger-cause (​F-test​ = 4.46, ​p-value​ = 0.01, steps  = 5 days) of the retweets from 
bots to bots, suggesting the possibility that some bots strategically coordinated 
among each other.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Online social media have been dealing with considerable issues of abuse and 
manipulation. Various studies showed that bots have been widely employed to affect 
public opinion. In this work, we examined the activity of a set of approximately 245K 
accounts active on Twitter during the last two US voting events: the 2016 
Presidential election and the 2018 midterms. Among this set of accounts, about 31K 
were labeled as likely bots by using Botometer. 
 
We analyzed the online behavior of humans and bots by comparing the volume and 
the temporal dynamics of their sharing activities. We showed that, while in 2016 bots 
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and humans tweeted at a different rate, in 2018, bots better aligned with humans’ 
activity trends, suggesting the hypothesis that some bots have grown more 
sophisticated. We also noticed a relevant reduction in the usage of retweets, both 
from human and bot accounts. Human users significantly increased the volume of 
replies, which denotes a growing propensity of humans in discussing (either 
positively and negatively) their ideas instead of simply re-sharing content generated 
by other users. This is a positive sign, since the spread of low-credibility content 
during the 2016 US presidential election has been often associated with 
indiscriminate re-sharing (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; Shao ​et al., ​2018; Vosoughi ​et al., 
2018). Bots, however, exhibited behaviors aimed at polling human opinions and 
preferences. 
 
While the increase in usage of replies, along with the reduction of retweets, may 
represent an encouraging step forward in the fight against misinformation, this 
intuition should be contextualized considering social media history and development 
over the last few years: Prior to the investigations into the 2016 US presidential 
election, most social media users may have not been aware of the existence of 
malicious and/or automated accounts. This may have changed over the course of 
the last few years. Although the observed change exhibited by human users in 2018 
provides an optimistic perspective, there exists an inevitable interplay between the 
behavior of human users and bots. The mutable nature of bots, coupled with their 
continuous online presence, should be cause of concern when considering the 
integrity of the online information ecosystem, especially with respect to online 
political discussions concerning voting events all over the world.  
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 This set of open problems poses numerous challenges in the fight against social 
media abuse and motivates further research for a better understanding of nefarious 
actors’ behavior, strategies, and their evolution over time. 
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Notes 
[1] ​https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/23/tech/facebook-transparency-report/index.html  
[2] ​https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-44682354 
[3] ​https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB1001 
[4] ​https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/ 
[5] Note that, to validate our findings, we repeated this evaluation at varying bot 
score threshold (from 0.3 to 0.7) with no significant changes on the results. 
[6] The in-degree centrality is a network analysis measure that assigns a score to 
every node in a network based only on the number of inbound links held by each 
node. Formally, the in-degree centrality of a generic node ​u ​is the number of its 
22 
incoming edges normalized by the maximal possible in-degree in the network, i.e., 
n-1​ in a network with n nodes. 
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